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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Amicus curiae National Association of Consumer Advocates
agrees with appellant Gunn that oral argument would be useful in this
case. Amicus is raising jurisdictional and other arguments not raised by
the named parties to this appeal. Counsel for amicus would participate
in oral argument if the Court believes that would be helpful.
i
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INTEREST OF AMICUS
This brief is filed by the National Association of Consumer 
Advocates (“NACA”) with the parties’ consent. NACA is a nationwide,
non-profit corporation whose over 1,700 members are private, public
sector, legal services, and non-profit lawyers, law professors, and law
students whose primary practices or interests involve consumer
protection. NACA is dedicated to furthering the ethical representation
of consumers.
Toward that end, NACA has issued its Standards and Guidelines
for Litigating and Settling Consumer Class Actions, the revised second
edition of which is published at 255 F.R.D. 215 (2009). The Standards
and Guidelines seek to promote and preserve the class action—which
NACA believes is a critical tool for consumer justice—by guarding
against its misuse. NACA believes that the decision below undermines
the class-action device to the detriment of consumers in two respects:
by employing a magistrate judge to enter final approval of a
class-action settlement contrary to constitutional requirements, and by
1
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deferring to class counsel’s views and reputation.1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Whether the magistrate judge lacked constitutional authority
to enter the final judgment below.
2. Whether a court may ever defer to the views or reputation of
class-action lawyers in approving a class-action settlement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Through life tenure and a ban on compensation reduction,
Article III of the Constitution ensures that citizens have independent
federal judges to adjudicate their rights. Though parties may waive
some constitutional protections, any waiver must be exercised freely.
Without voluntary consent from absent class members, entry of a final
judgment approving a class-action settlement by a non-Article III
magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §636(c) is unconstitutional because
the absentees cannot freely relinquish their rights to an Article III
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5), amicus1
certifies that no party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part
and that no party, party’s counsel, or other person other than amicus or
its counsel contributed money intended to fund the preparation or
submission of the brief.
2
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judge. Moreover, even if section 636(c) were constitutional when
applied to class actions generally, in this case, the settlement cannot
bind the class because the absentees lacked constitutionally adequate
notice that they would be surrendering their constitutional rights to be
heard by an Article III judge.
More broadly, section 636(c) is facially unconstitutional because it
grants magistrate judges power to enter final judgment that the
Constitution bestows only on Article III judges. Section 636(c) upsets
the constitutional system of checks and balances by removing the
safeguards that ensure an independent judiciary. This problem cannot
be cured by the parties’ consent because non-parties often have a
profound interest in a case’s outcome and, thus, in an independent
judiciary. 
II. In approving the class-action settlement below, the magistrate
judge deferred to class counsel’s reputation and their views on the
settlement. Not unlike our Article III concerns, any such deference
undermines the court’s role as an independent decision maker. The
magistrate judge deferred because he thought it problematic to
substitute his judgment for counsel’s judgment. But a court’s role is to
3
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substitute its independent judgment for that of the lawyers appearing
before it, particularly in the class-action settlement context, where the
court must guard against collusion and act as a fiduciary for the class.
ARGUMENT
I. The Magistrate Judge Lacked Constitutional Authority to
Enter Final Judgment. 
NACA believes that the magistrate judge lacked constitutional
authority to enter final judgment in this case. The facts relevant to that
issue are straightforward. On May 20, 2011, all named parties
consented to refer the case to a United States magistrate judge to
conduct all proceedings and enter final judgment. Doc. 90. Plaintiff’s
counsel consented on behalf of named plaintiff Miranda Day only. See
id. At that point, the class had not been certified, and, therefore,
plaintiff’s counsel lacked authority to act on anyone else’s behalf. The
consents were executed under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), which provides that
“[u]pon consent of the parties,” a magistrate judge “may conduct any or
all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of
judgment in the case, when specifically designated to exercise such
jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves.” On May 23, 2011,
4
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U.S. District Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington referred the case
to a magistrate judge for all further proceedings and entry of final
judgment. Doc. 90.
On September 20, 2011, the parties entered the class-action
settlement challenged in this appeal. See Doc. 110-1; see also Doc. 150-
3. As part of that settlement, the named plaintiff and the defendants
agreed that the case could be certified as a class action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). See Doc. 110-1, at 10.
The magistrate judge granted the parties’ motion for
preliminary approval of the settlement, see Docs. 110 & 112, which
included approval of a notice to be sent to the class. Doc. 111-1. The
class notice did not explain that each class member had a right to
proceed before an Article III judge nor that Miranda Day earlier had
purported to extinguish those rights by consenting to the magistrate
judge. The only reference to the words “magistrate judge” was on page
seven of the eight-page notice, and there the notice stated only that a
final approval hearing would be held in front of the magistrate judge.
Id. at 7. On the next page, however, the notice admonished the
5
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absentees that they should not contact “THE JUDGE’S
CHAMBERS.” Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). Otherwise, the notice
referred repeatedly to “the Court,” but not to the magistrate judge.  
A. The Question Whether the Magistrate Judge Lacked
Authority to Enter Final Judgment is Jurisdictional
and, Therefore, Must Be Decided by This Court.
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “[e]very
federal appellate court has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only
of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause
under review,’ even though the parties are prepared to concede it.”
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95, 118 S. Ct. 1003,
1013 (1998) (citations omitted). NACA is questioning the magistrate
judge’s authority to enter final judgment approving the settlement.
This argument was not raised by any named party or any objector.
This Court is nevertheless required to consider it now because it
presents the question whether the magistrate judge had jurisdiction to
enter final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (“The consent of the
parties allows a magistrate judge … to exercise civil jurisdiction … .”
(emphasis added)). This Court has held that the question whether
6
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section 636(c)’s statutory requirements have been satisfied is a
“jurisdictional question” that should be raised sua sponte. McNab v. J
& J Marine, Inc., 240 F.3d 1326, 1328 (11th Cir. 2001). Whether and in
what circumstances 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) can constitutionally extend to
class actions is likewise a jurisdictional question that must be resolved
by this Court. See Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, ___ F.3d
___, 2012 WL 1948970, *7 (3d Cir. May 31, 2012).
 B. The Magistrate Judge Lacked Constitutional
Authority to Enter Final Judgment in This Class
Action.
1. Article III of the Constitution vests the federal judicial power
in the Supreme Court and “such inferior Courts” as Congress chooses
to establish. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. It goes on to protect judicial
independence by affording federal judges life tenure during good
behavior and prohibiting Congress from reducing their salaries. Id.
The Framers included these protections in Article III to ensure that an
impartial judiciary would adjudicate the rights of citizens. N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58, 102 S. Ct. 2858,
7
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2864-65 (1982).2
The magistrate judge who entered final judgment below is not an
Article III judge. Magistrate judges are appointed to terms of either
four or eight years by the judges of the district court in which the
magistrate judge is selected to serve. 28 U.S.C. § 631(a), (e). An act of
Congress prohibits reduction in their salaries during this term, see id.
§ 634(b), but Congress could remove this prohibition without offending
the Constitution. Moreover, because magistrate judges may be (but
need not be) reappointed, they lack the independence that Article III
judges gain from the knowledge that, once appointed, others do not
hold the key to their continued employment.
The magistrate judge entered final judgment below under 28
U.S.C. § 636(c), which permits a magistrate judge to conduct all
proceedings in a civil case, and to enter final judgment, but only “upon
consent of the parties.” Id. As we now explain, because entering final
judgment under § 636(c) deprives absent class members of their rights
to adjudicate their claims before independent judges who enjoy the
All citations to Northern Pipeline are to Justice Brennan’s four-2
justice plurality opinion.
8
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protections of Article III without their consent, the statute is
unconstitutional as applied to class actions, at least in the
circumstances presented here, where the absent class members have
not consented.3
2. The Supreme Court has never addressed whether
section 636(c) is consistent with Article III, but it has withstood
constitutional challenge in the circuit courts in non-class-action cases,
including in this Court. See Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516,
1519 (11th Cir. 1987); but see infra Part I.D (arguing that section
636(c) is facially unconstitutional). The decisions upholding section
636(c) have placed great weight on its consent requirement. See, e.g.,
Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (7th
Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725
F.2d 537, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc). As this Court has put it,
Absent class members could provide the individual consent3
demanded by section 636(c) in an opt-in class action, such as that
authorized under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Moreover, in the standard Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action, consent
might be sought from class members in conjunction with the
distribution of class relief. That was impossible here because the
settlement provides no relief to the absent class members.
9
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“valid consent is the linchpin of the constitutionality of … § 636(c).”
Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Adams
v. Heckler, 794 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The consent requirement seeks to legitimate what would
otherwise be the unconstitutional exercise of the judicial power by
magistrate judges. See, e.g., Fowler, 899 F.2d at 1093 (reversing
judgment because magistrate conducted trial without parties’ consent).
In an ordinary case, the parties indicate their consent by signing a
waiver that informs them of their absolute right to have their case
tried by an Article III judge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(2). Here, the
defendants and the named plaintiff signed a waiver through
individually retained counsel. Doc. 90. The absent class members,
however, did not.
3. To be sure, the efficient administration of class-action lawsuits
requires that lawyers and representative plaintiffs make some
decisions on the class’s behalf. But this deviation from the ordinary
relationship between lawyers and their clients has limits. A procedure
10
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will be invalidated “in those cases where it cannot be said that the
procedure adopted, fairly insures the protection of the interests of
absent parties who are to be bound by it.” Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 42, 61 S. Ct. 115, 118 (1940). The absent class members’ rights to
an adjudication before an Article III judge involves an interest guarded
by the Constitution. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58, 102 S. Ct. at
2864. The procedure at issue here—the application of section 636(c) in
class-action suits—does not “fairly insure[]” that this interest is
protected because it allows a non-Article III judge to adjudicate the
rights of absent class members without their consent. Section 636(c) is,
therefore, unconstitutional as applied to class actions.
 This conclusion is buttressed by the understanding that, to be
constitutional, consent under section 636(c) must be voluntary. Hall v.
Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644, 647 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting that “voluntary
consent is crucial to [section 636(c)’s] procedure”) (emphasis added); see
also Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 543 (“The waiver of personal rights must,
of course, be freely and voluntarily undertaken.”); S. Rep. No. 96-74, at
5 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1469, 1473 (“The Bill clearly
11
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requires the voluntary consent of the parties.”). Both the Congress that
enacted section 636(c) and the courts that have upheld it had
reservations about the possibility that litigants would be coerced into
abandoning their right to an Article III judge. See id.
This Court has recognized that a robust consent requirement is
necessary to “ensure[] against the wholesale delegation of certain
classes of cases and discrimination among classes of litigants.” Hall,
812 F.2d at 647; see also Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 554 (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting) (expressing concern about economic coercion of less-
advantaged litigants). The Seventh Circuit expressed a similar concern
in a caveat to its decision upholding section 636(c): “We do not believe
that reference of civil matters to magistrates can be sustained against
constitutional challenge unless an alternative of trial before an Article
III judge is maintained for all litigants as a realistic and viable
alternative.” Geras, 742 F.2d at 1042 (emphasis added).
Because class actions operate through vicarious representation,
in which neither the named plaintiff nor the lawyer consult with the
absentees (let alone obtain informed consent to act on their behalf), the
12
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named plaintiff’s consent cannot guard against coercion. Allowing class
actions to proceed before magistrate judges thus illustrates the
concern, articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Geras, that litigants will
be forced before a magistrate judge against their interests and without
a “realistic and viable” alternative to proceed before an Article III
judge. See id.
Moreover, class actions allow plaintiffs to pool their small claims
and overcome the otherwise prohibitive cost of litigation. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2973
(1985). Absentees, then, may have no viable alternative to the class
action before a magistrate judge who has been forced on them, without
their consent, by the named representative. In this way, section 636(c)
discriminates “among classes of litigants,” Hall, 812 F.2d at 647, by
creating a framework in which absentees either surrender their rights
to an Article III judge or effectively lose their ability to vindicate their
rights at all.
4. NACA acknowledges that two courts of appeals have rejected
challenges to class-action settlements on the ground that they were
13
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approved by magistrate judges without the absentees’ consent. See
Dewey, 2012 WL 1948970, *7; Williams v. General Elec. Capital Auto
Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 268-70 (7th Cir. 1998). In general, these
decisions are inapposite because they concern mainly the statutory
question whether absent class members are “parties” that must
consent within the meaning of section 636(c), not the constitutional
question presented here whether absentees may be bound by a
magistrate judge’s final judgment if they have not personally
consented (even assuming section 636(c) does not require such
consent).4
Dewey and Williams appear to have been motivated in large part
We believe that under Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 122 S.4
Ct. 2005 (2002)—which post-dates the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in
Williams and held that absent class members are “parties” entitled to
appeal approval of a class-action settlement—absent class members are
“parties” who must provide consent under section 636(c). After all, what
was “most important” to Devlin’s holding was that, without the right to
appeal, absentees would be bound to a decision with which they
disagreed. See id. at 10-11, 122 S. Ct. at 2011. That reasoning applies
equally here because, without a right to consent individually, absentees
are bound to the named plaintiff’s relinquishment of their rights to an
adjudication before an Article III judge. Thus, this Court could decide
the section 636(c) question on statutory grounds and avoid the
constitutional issues.
14
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by what they viewed as the “radical result” that would be wrought by a
ruling that magistrate judges lack authority to enter final judgment in
most or all class actions. Dewey, 2012 WL 1948970, *7; Williams, 159
F.3d at 269. That reasoning is at odds with both courts’
acknowledgments that an absent class member may intervene and
demand that an Article III judge preside, which would effectively
override the named plaintiff’s consent to a magistrate judge. Dewey,
2012 WL 1948970, *7; Williams, 159 F.3d at 269.
In any event, those courts’ concerns are misplaced. Undersigned
counsel has been involved in dozens of class actions over the last two
decades, and, in his experience, only rarely do the named parties
consent to a magistrate judge’s entry of final judgment under section
636(c). Moreover, under the ruling sought here by NACA, magistrate
judges would still be available in class actions to exercise their many
functions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), including recommending the final
approval of a class-action settlement to an Article III district judge.
 But the fundamental answer to the concerns expressed by Dewey
and Williams is that the courts have not shied away from the
15
Case: 12-11887     Date Filed: 06/25/2012     Page: 27 of 53 
consequences of rulings enforcing Article III principles even when they
have  “radically” overridden congressional expedients. Northern
Pipeline, for instance, invalidated the entire federal bankruptcy
scheme because non-Article III judges had been given authority to
decide all manner of cases that the Constitution assigns solely to
Article III judges. 458 U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858. And, just last year, in
Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), a decision that appears to
have far-reaching consequences, the Court reminded Congress, again
in the bankruptcy context, that it generally may not assign the
business of Article III courts to decision makers who lack Article III
protections. See generally Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and
the Federal System 26-31 (6th ed. 2011 Supp.).
5. Alternatively, the entry of final judgment here was
unconstitutional because Miranda Day’s consent to the magistrate
judge was entered solely on her own  behalf, see Doc. 90 (May 23,
2011), well before she had authority to act on the class members’
behalf, which did not occur until the magistrate judge certified the
class as part of his settlement approval. Doc. 157 (Mar. 12, 2012); see
16
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also Doc. 112, at 3 (Sept. 29, 2011) (appointing class counsel). Thus,
even assuming (incorrectly) that Miranda Day or her lawyers later
possessed the authority as representatives of a certified class to
consent to the entry of final judgment on behalf of the class members,
they did not have that authority at the time of the consent. The
argument that the absentees’ “consented” to the entry of a final
judgment by the magistrate judge necessarily depends on the useful
fiction of representation created by class certification. It stretches that
fiction to fantasy if the absentees’ “consent” is deemed to have been
provided before any class existed. Put another way, although consent
to a magistrate judge may be implied by the parties’ actual conduct,
see Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 123 S. Ct. 1696 (2003), it cannot be
manufactured out of whole cloth.
*     *     *
In sum, the decision of a magistrate judge approving a class-
action settlement cannot bind absent class members who have not
individually consented to the entry of final judgment by the magistrate
judge. The decision below should be reversed for that reason alone.
17
Case: 12-11887     Date Filed: 06/25/2012     Page: 29 of 53 
C. The Magistrate Judge Lacked Authority to Enter
Final Judgment Because the Absent Class Members
Were Not Given Constitutionally Adequate Notice
That a Magistrate Judge Had Been Given That
Power.
Even if section 636(c) is constitutional as applied to class actions
generally, it was not employed constitutionally here because the
absentees were not notified that they would be relinquishing their
right to an Article III decision maker and that a magistrate judge
would enter final judgment. For this reason, the absentees’ due process
rights were violated, and the decision below should be reversed.
In ordinary bi-polar litigation, “[i]t is a principle of general
application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by
a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as
a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process.” Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40, 61 S. Ct. at 117; see also Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184 (1989). Class
litigation is a “recognized exception” to that general rule. Hansberry,
311 U.S. at 41, 61 S. Ct. at 118. An absent class member is neither
“designated” by name as a party nor served with process. For
18
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absentees, a different, but no less important, set of due process
requirements apply before a class judgment can bind them.
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12, 105 S. Ct.
at 2974, the Supreme Court described the “minimal procedural due
process protections” necessary to “bind an absent plaintiff concerning a
claim for money damages or similar relief.” In particular, “[t]he
plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and
participate in the litigation … . The notice should describe the action
and the plaintiffs’ rights in it.” Id. (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306  314-15, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657 (1950)
(emphasis added)). Controlling authority establishes that a class
judgment may not be accorded binding effect if the class-action notice
is not exacting in how it describes the claims and the plaintiffs’ rights
in the litigation. See Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222,
1227-28 (11th Cir. 1998) (authorizing collateral attack on class-action
settlement by absentee because although settlement itself may have
covered absentee’s claims, the settlement notice did not adequately
disclose that the claims were covered); In re Nissan Motor Corp.
19
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Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088, 1103-05 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding class-
action notice inadequate when it omitted terms of proposed settlement
because for absentees “[t]his will be their primary, if not exclusive,
source of information for deciding how to exercise their rights”).5
Here, the class notice did not come close to meeting what due
process demands regarding the absentees’ rights to an Article III
decision maker. The class notice nowhere explained that Miranda Day
had purported to relinquish the class members’ rights to an Article III
judge (much less that the class members possessed those rights).
Indeed, as noted earlier (at 5), the only reference to the words
“magistrate judge” was buried on page seven of the eight-page notice.
Doc. 111-1, at 7. There, the notice stated only that a final approval
hearing would be held in front of the magistrate judge. That was
followed, confusingly, on the next page with an admonition that the
absentees should not contact “THE JUDGE’S CHAMBERS,”
Due process also requires that absentees be allowed to opt out of5
class actions seeking money damages. See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812, 105
S. Ct. at 2974. The notice and opt-out rights work in tandem, as an
opportunity to opt out is meaningless if the absentees are unaware of
the rights at stake.
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suggesting that someone other than the magistrate judge was involved
in the case. Id. at 8 (italics added). Adding the notice’s repeated
references to the “Court,” a reader of the notice might well be confused
about the identity of the decision maker.
We realize that the readers of a class notice are lay people, not
lawyers, and, therefore, it is equally likely that the notice, rather than
confusing the class members, conveyed nothing to them about their
rights to an adjudication before an Article III decision maker. And, it
was that omission, if not the confusing nature of the notice standing
alone, that created the due process violation. See Bogard v. Cook, 586
F.2d 399, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1978) (refusing to give preclusive effect to
class judgment because notice omitted express reference to the type of
claims pursued by class member in subsequent suit). Put another way,
the absentees could have had no idea that Miranda Day was proposing
to give away their rights to an Article III decision maker unless they
were told about it.
Moreover, as noted above (at 15), both Dewey and Williams
acknowledge that absent class members may intervene and demand
21
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that an Article III judge preside, overriding the named plaintiff’s
consent to a magistrate judge. 2012 WL 1948970, *7; 159 F.3d at 269.
That acknowledgment makes all the more important a notice clearly
informing the absentees that the named plaintiff proposes to release
their right to an Article III judge. A class member would not intervene
to protect a right that she did not know the named plaintiff was
proposing to relinquish.
For these reasons as well, the decision below should be reversed.
D. Section 636(c) Is Facially Unconstitutional Because It
Allows Magistrate Judges to Wield the Judicial
Power of the United States.
The previous sections of this brief concern the constitutionality of
section 636(c) as is applies to unconsenting class members. This Court
could go further and revisit its ruling in Sinclair, 814 F.2d 1516, which
upheld the constitutionality of section 636(c) in the non-class-action
context. Sinclair did not itself analyze the issue, but instead cited
rulings of other circuits, finding them “persuasive.”  Id. at 1519.
Despite the “unbroken phalanx of … authority” sustaining
section 636(c) against constitutional challenge, Geras, 742 F.2d at 1045
22
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(Posner, J., dissenting), we are convinced that section 636(c) oversteps
Article III bounds in allowing a magistrate judge to wield the judicial
power of the United States by entering final judgment. See id. at 1045-
54; see also Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc. v. Clark Oil & Refining
Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1319-20 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Arnold, J.,
dissenting). 
As noted above, courts upholding section 636(c) have focused on
consent as the “linchpin” of the statute’s constitutionality. This focus
assumes that Article III is concerned solely with individual litigants’
rights of access to an independent judge. To be sure, this is an
important interest. See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58, 102 S. Ct.
2864. But Article III “is concerned with more than fairness to the
parties in any given case.” Lehman Bros., 739 F.2d at 1319 (Arnold, J.,
dissenting). Allowing magistrate judges to enter final judgments also
(1) disrupts the structural checks and balances established by the
Constitution and (2) affects the rights of unconsenting citizens who are
not parties to the suit. See id.
23
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Cases upholding section 636(c) dismiss the separation-of-powers
concerns on the ground that magistrate judges are appointed by
Article III judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(a). So, the argument goes,
magistrate judges are not susceptible to pressure by the executive or
legislative branches. See, e.g., Geras, 742 F.2d at 1043. This argument
founders on several fronts.
First, it ignores the most likely forms of congressional
encroachment during a magistrate judge’s tenure (regardless of who
holds the appointment power). Article III’s tenure and salary
protections recognize that the judiciary could be controlled by the
other branches if they retained control over the judges’ employment or
salaries. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 59, 102 S. Ct. at 2865. 
Although the judiciary may control a magistrate judge’s chances for
reappointment, Congress can eliminate a magistrate judge’s position
altogether, can reduce her salary from one term to the next, or can,
with an act repealing the current statutory (that is, non-constitutional)
prohibition, reduce her salary now. See Geras, 742 F.2d 1052-53
(Posner, J., dissenting).
24
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Second, that Article III judges appoint magistrate judges defies
the Constitution’s separation of powers even before they begin to serve.
Appointment by the judiciary encroaches on the President’s power to
appoint judges and the Senate’s power to confirm them. Lehman Bros.,
739 F.2d at 1319 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
Finally, the Constitution is concerned with intra-branch checks
and balances in addition to inter-branch checks and balances. The
lifetime-appointment protection is important, among other reasons,
because it protects district court judges from appellate judges and
appellate judges from Supreme Court Justices. “Appellate judges can
reverse district judges, can mandamus them, can criticize them, can
remand a case to another judge, but cannot fire district judges, cow
them, or silence them—cannot prevent them from making independent
judgments and expressing independent views.” Geras, 742 F.2d at 1053
(Posner, J., dissenting). Magistrate judges do not have the same
independence because, though they enter final judgments in the
district court, they rely on district court judges for their
reappointment. See Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding
25
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Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: a Dissenting View, 88 Yale
L.J. 1023, 1056-58 (1979) (detailed discussion of intra-branch
pressures on magistrates that undermine Article III values).
Meanwhile, in addition to doing nothing to ease these separation-
of-powers concerns, the consent requirement does not go far enough to
protect the individual rights that an independent judiciary is meant to
vindicate. All citizens, not just those who have consented, have a stake
in “the quality of the administration of federal [and state] law.” Geras,
742 F.2d at 1051 (Posner, J., dissenting). Apart from this generalized
interest in an independent judiciary, nonparties are often affected
profoundly by a case’s outcome. District court cases can have far-
reaching consequences, and when, for example, a magistrate judge
rules on a statute’s constitutionality, the result affects many others
beyond the parties who relinquished their rights to an Article III
judge. See id. 
Nor can section 636(c) be justified on the theory that magistrate
judges enter final judgments as “adjuncts” to Article III judges.
Though most courts upholding section 636(c) have focused on consent,
26
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others have advanced the additional rationale that magistrates are
“adjuncts” to address the separation-of-powers concerns that
individual consent cannot cure. See Lehman Bros., 739 F.2d at 1315-
16.
Magistrate judges are properly described as adjuncts when they
administer oaths, 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(2), rule on pretrial matters, id.
§ 636(b)(1)(A), and conduct hearings, id. § 636(b)(1)(B). But when they
rule finally in a civil case, “[t]hey are deciding who should win cases,
and entering judgments accordingly.” Lehman Bros., 739 F.2d at 1319
(Arnold, J., dissenting). This is the exercise of “the judicial power in
the most basic sense.” Id.; accord Geras, 742 F.2d at 1047 (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
Again, we acknowledge that this Court has upheld section 636(c),
and we emphasize that the earlier sections of this brief provide
narrower bases for reversal. But the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Stern, 131 S. Ct. 2594, suggests that this Court’s earlier ruling
should be revisited. First, Stern focused heavily on the separation-of-
powers concerns of the Northern Pipeline plurality, id. at 2609-10,
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which in turn had noted that allowing magistrates to issue
recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) is constitutional because
Article III judges retain final decision making authority. Northern
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 79, 102 S. Ct. at 2875 (discussing United States v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 100 S. Ct. 2406 (1980)). Stern thus draws into
question the continuing importance of litigant-specific concerns such
as consent. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478
U.S. 833, 867, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3266 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(explaining why “consent is irrelevant to Article III analysis”); Hart &
Wechsler’s, supra, at 30 (noting that Stern’s separation-of-powers focus
“echoes” Justice Brennan’s Schor dissent). 
 Second, Stern rejected the argument that bankruptcy judges,
who, like magistrate judges, do not receive the protections of Article
III, are adjuncts to district court judges. The Court found that
bankruptcy judges are not adjuncts because they “resolve ‘[a]ll matters
of fact and law in whatever domains of the law to which’ the parties’
[]claims might lead.” 131 S. Ct. at 2618-19 (quoting Northern Pipeline,
458 U.S. at 91, 102 S. Ct. at 2882) (first alteration in original). So, too,
28
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does a magistrate judge exercising her authority under section 636(c).
The Court in Stern was swayed by the extent of the bankruptcy judge’s
final decision-making authority: “[A] bankruptcy court … has the
power to enter ‘appropriate orders and judgments’—including final
judgments—subject to review only if a party chooses to appeal.” Id. at
2619 (citation omitted). That describes precisely the authority that a
magistrate judge exercises under section 636(c)—that is, a magistrate
judge, when authorized to enter final judgment, is no more an adjunct
to the district court than was the bankruptcy judge in Stern.
In sum, section 636(c)’s authorization to enter final judgments is
unconstitutional.
II. A Court Should Never Defer to the Views or Reputation of
Counsel in Deciding Whether to Approve a Class-Action
Settlement. 
As part of his famous exposition on judicial independence, Chief
Justice Marshall reminded us that “[t]he government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). And yet,
the magistrate judge below approved a class-action settlement based
29
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not solely on his independent scrutiny of the law and facts, but instead
in significant part on deference to the class lawyers’ “judgment” that
the settlement was a good deal. See Doc. 157, at 22. The magistrate
judge went on to trumpet those lawyers’ legal ability and personal
integrity. Doc. 157, at 22-23; see also id. at 15, 16, 31-32 (similar
statements). The magistrate judge’s approach, we admit, was not
unusual; many other cases have done the same thing, all but
abdicating the judicial role to lawyers, and, sometimes, nearly fawning
over their reputations in the course of settlement approval.6
NACA agrees with appellant Gunn that the magistrate judge’s
reliance on class counsel’s recommendation to approve the settlement
and on their stellar personal attributes was reversible error on the
facts here. See Br. of Appellant 34-40. NACA asks the Court to go
further and hold that under no circumstances may a court give weight
to settling counsel’s judgment about the wisdom of a class settlement
or rely on class counsel’s reputation in assessing a settlement’s
See, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 305 F. Supp. 2d 100, 1066
(D.D.C. 2004); Brotherton v. Cleveland, 141 F. Supp. 2d 894, 906 (S.D.
Ohio 2001); Wattleton v. Ladish Co., 89 F.R.D. 677, 685 (E.D. Wis.
1981).
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fairness or legality. In NACA’s view, that assessment is solely for the
court.
We turn first to the magistrate judge’s suggestion that he was
bound by this Court’s precedent. The Court’s decision in Canupp v.
Liberty Behavioral Healthcare Corp., 447 Fed. App’x. 976 (11th Cir.
2011)—accurately cited by the magistrate judge when he deferred to
the “judgment … of counsel,” Doc. 157, at 22—is no barrier to the
ruling NACA seeks here. First, Canupp is unpublished and, therefore,
not binding. Second, the Court’s precedential reversal of a class-action
settlement approval in Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144
(11th Cir. 1983), although acknowledging that courts have placed
“great weight” on counsel’s judgment, id. at 1149, appears to have
rejected that approach precisely because it undermines judicial
independence in a context where independence is critical. “Reliance on
counsel’s opinion,” Holmes explained, “tends to render the district
court captive to the attorney and fosters rubber stamping by the court
rather than the careful scrutiny which is essential in judicial approval
31
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of class action settlements.” Id. at 1150. Having cleared the
precedential decks, we now turn to what the rule should be.
In conveying why the deference embraced by the district court
should be rejected, first consider how such deference might apply in
ordinary, one-on-one litigation. Assume that the judge is presented
with a motion in limine. The plaintiff’s brief argues that the evidence
is not hearsay and therefore admissible, while the defendant’s brief,
naturally, argues that the evidence is hearsay and must be excluded.
And suppose that, in ruling on the motion, the judge says, “This is a
close case. Having read the briefs and reviewed the facts and law, I
rule in the plaintiff’s favor, deferring to the judgment of plaintiff’s
counsel and taking judicial notice of her fine reputation for first-rate
legal analysis and integrity.” This hypothetical ruling would almost
certainly never occur in real life—because a judge is supposed to base
her decisions solely on the law and facts, and decide cases
independently—and, if it did, reversal would be quick and decisive.
Turning to class-action settlements, there is more reason to be
concerned about abdication of judicial independence and deference to
32
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counsel in that context than in traditional bi-polar litigation. There,
the mass of plaintiffs—the absentees—have agreed to nothing because
they have no relationship with their lawyer, and they have no way to
monitor their lawyer’s conduct and assure that she is acting in their
interests. Class settlements therefore present the possibility of
collusive (or at least sub-optimal) deals, in which the defendant
maximizes its “purchase [of] res judicata,” Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000), the class members receive very
little (or, as in this case, zero), while, in exchange, plaintiffs’ counsel
receives “red-carpet treatment on fees.” Weinberger v. Great N.
Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 524 (1st Cir. 1991).7
Many courts that have deferred to the views of counsel have not
provided a detailed rationale—generally saying only that settlement is
favored and counsel is more familiar with the nuances of the case than
they are. See, e.g., Trief v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 840 F. Supp. 277,
281 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D.
For a partial collection of judicial opinions and legal scholarship7
on the potential for break down in the agency relationship between
lawyer and client in class actions, see Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 627 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Cal. 1979). To be sure, once a class-action settlement occurs, the
named parties are non-adverse, and judges do not have the lawyers’
help in ferreting out the case’s strengths and weaknesses as they do in
other cases. So, perhaps judges think deference is appropriate when
they perceive themselves to be in the dark.
But that the parties are non-adverse cuts the other way. After all, a
Rule 23(e) fairness hearing can be “staged performance,” jointly
produced by class and defense counsel, at which “the court can’t
vindicate the class’s rights because the friendly presentation means
that it lacks essential information.” Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston
Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1352 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., joined by
Manion, Rovner, and Wood, JJ., and Posner, C.J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).  The answer to that serious problem is
not to make it worse by deferring to the lawyers, but to insist that the
lower court probe the settling parties’ assertions, listen to objectors
(the only true adversaries), and “act[] as a fiduciary … [to] serve as a
guardian of the rights of absent class members.” In re General Motors
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Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 785
(3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
One element of the ruling below underscores why deference to
counsel should be impermissible in the class settlement context. The
magistrate judge’s settlement approval was premised in part on the
fact that class counsel “are well known to me,” giving him a basis for
praising their “exceptional legal abilities” and “utmost integrity.” Doc.
157, at 22. But, like many class actions, this case was nationwide in
scope, comprised of absentees (and their lawyers) who were unknown
to the magistrate judge. Appellant Gunn, for instance, is from Ohio,
Doc. 133, at 11, and his lawyer is from Washington, D.C., id. at 25-26.
They could not, therefore, garner the “well-known-to-me” deference
that the magistrate judge accorded class counsel.
NACA wants to be clear. It is not anti-class action. Indeed, it
favors their vigorous use. Class actions are enormously useful tools for
justice. For decades, they have compensated discrimination victims,
reformed oppressive governmental institutions, and deterred a wide
array of wrongful business conduct where individuals, acting alone,
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would not have had the means to sue on their own. See Thorogood, 627
F.3d at 294-95 (noting that class actions are “indispensable for the
litigation of many meritorious claims”). But class actions can be
abused, souring the public and political leaders, and jeopardizing the
prospect of justice. It is for this reason that NACA has published its
Standards and Guidelines for Litigating and Settling Consumer Class
Actions, 255 F.R.D. 215 (2d ed. 2009), which are aimed at promoting
class actions by curbing their misuse.
The magistrate judge here, like other courts approving class-
action settlements, proclaimed that “the court should be hesitant to
substitute its judgment for that of counsel.” Doc. 157, at 22; see also,
e.g., Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1983); Lopez
v. City of Santa Fe, 206 F.R.D. 285, 292 (D.N.M. 2002). That rationale
has a ring to it because, in some contexts, as in administrative law, see
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 7, 122 S. Ct. 431, 434 (2001),
or appellate review of district-court fact finding, the law accords one
public official primary decision making authority over another.
36
Case: 12-11887     Date Filed: 06/25/2012     Page: 48 of 53 
But the law accords no deference to lawyers. Lawyers are charged
by the adversary system to make arguments for clients, not to
determine the law and facts. Put another way, contrary to the
magistrate judge’s understanding, it is exactly the role of a court to
substitute its judgment for the judgments of lawyers. That is all the
more true, as we have said, in the class settlement context, because of
concerns that some lawyers, unless properly policed, might abandon
their clients altogether.
In sum, this Court should hold that a court may never defer to
settling counsel’s views or reputation in determining whether a class-
action settlement is fair and lawful.
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse because the magistrate judge exercised
power that the Constitution reserves to Article III judges. If the Court
disagrees, it should reverse because the magistrate judge
impermissibly deferred to class counsel’s views and reputation in
approving the settlement.
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REPLY BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES
In this reply brief, the National Association of Consumer
Advocates (“NACA”) responds to the briefs filed by the appellees on the
two issues addressed by NACA in its opening brief: (1) whether and
under what circumstances a magistrate judge has constitutional
authority to enter a final judgment approving a class-action settlement;
and (2)  whether a district court may defer to the views and reputation
of counsel who are proponents of a class-action settlement in deciding
whether to approve that settlement.1
ARGUMENT
I. The Magistrate Judge Lacked Constitutional Authority to
Enter Final Judgment. 
A. The Magistrate Judge Lacked Authority to Enter
Final Judgment Because the Absent Class Members
Did Not Provide Their Consent. 
1.a.  NACA’s opening brief (at 7-13) explained that the decisions
 Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5), amicus1
certifies that no party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part
and that no party, party’s counsel, or other person other than amicus or
its counsel contributed money intended to fund the preparation or
submission of the brief.
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of the courts of appeals upholding the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. §
636(c) hinged not on the presumed consent of the parties, but on the
actual, personal, and voluntary consent of the parties. As then-Judge
Anthony Kennedy put it, the Constitution demands that section 636(c)’s
“waiver of personal rights must, of course, be freely and voluntarily
undertaken.” Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc.,
725 F.2d 537, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (emphasis added); see
also, e.g., Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644, 647 (11th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that “voluntary consent is crucial to [section 636(c)’s] procedure”)
(emphasis added). Thus, absent class members cannot constitutionally
be bound to a class-action judgment under the purported authority of
section 636(c) unless they, like all other litigants, have personally and
voluntarily consented to a final adjudication before the magistrate
judge.
The settling parties make no attempt to explain how the absent
class members’ conduct—or, more properly put, their
inactivity—constitutes their personal and voluntary consent. Instead,
they rely on two circuit court cases, Dewey v. Volkswagen
2
Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2012), and Williams v. General
Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 268-70 (7th Cir. 1998),
both of which are addressed in NACA’s opening brief (at 13-16). With
all respect, the problem with this argument is that, like the settling
parties,  neither case explains how no consent on the part of the
absentees can equal their personal and voluntary consent. Rather,
those cases reject NACA’s position on efficiency grounds: that is, on the
view that such a “radical result” would make it nearly impossible for
magistrate judges to enter final judgments in class actions. See Dewey,
681 F.3d at 181; Williams, 159 F.3d at 269.
NACA’s opening brief (at 9 n.3, 15) explained that the “radical
result” argument was wrong on its own terms because (1) class-action
judgments rarely are entered by magistrate judges—a point that the
settling parties do not contest; (2) in some cases, the class members’
consent could be sought, and (3) magistrate judges could still preside
over class actions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). But more fundamentally,
the settling parties overlook that Article III deliberately eschews
efficiency in exchange for life-tenured, independent federal judges even
3
when the result is tumultuous. See NACA Br. 15-16 (discussing result
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982)).
b. CareOne asserts that if an absent class member prefers an
Article III judge, she “can apply to the district court to intervene.”
CareOne Br. 52. That is true, but it supports NACA’s position. If a class
member intervenes and demands an Article III judge that effectively
overrides any consent given to the magistrate judge by the named
plaintiff—because the district judge and the magistrate judge cannot
both enter a final judgment—leaving the “radical result” that CareOne
claims to abhor.2
 Even assuming that intervention were a sensible alternative in2
principle, it makes no sense in this case because the class-action notice
did not tell the absentees that they had a right to an Article III judge
and that the named plaintiff proposed to relinquish it, rendering any
intervention right illusory. See NACA Opening Br. 15, 21-22; infra at 7-
10. CareOne’s claim that the absent class members’ opt-out rights
negated their rights to an Article III judge fails for the same reason.
See CareOne Br. 53 n.13. The class members here could not have opted
out to preserve their rights to an Article III judge because they were
not told about that right or that the class representative was trying to
relinquish it. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628,
117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997) (observing that an opt-out right is
meaningful only if class members “have the information or foresight
(continued...)
4
c. CareOne claims that an absentee may also “raise a collateral
attack” on the named plaintiff’s consent to a non-Article III decision
maker. CareOne Br. 52 (citing Williams, 155 F.3d at 269). But a rule
encouraging collateral attacks makes no sense because it would leave
open the possibility that judgments believed to be final could be
rendered non-preclusive years after their entry. In any event, the
potential for collateral attack is no reason not to protect the absentees’
rights to an Article III judge in the first place.
2. As explained in NACA’s opening brief (at 16-17), the Court
could decide this appeal on the alternative (and narrower) ground that
the entry of final judgment here was unconstitutional because Miranda
Day’s consent to the magistrate judge was entered solely on her own
behalf, see Doc. 90 (May 23, 2011), well before she had any authority to
act on the class members’ behalf, which did not occur until the
(...continued)2
needed to decide, intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out”). Care
One’s argument is also wrong because the right to opt out is not a
substitute for, but in addition to, the other rights guaranteed by the
Constitution and Rule 23. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 812, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 2974 (1985); Eisen v. Jacquelin &
Carlisle, 417 U.S. 156, 175-76, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2151-52 (1974).
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magistrate judge certified the class as part of his settlement approval.
Doc. 157 (Mar. 12, 2012).
None of the settling parties respond to this point directly. In what
may be intended as an oblique response, however, Day says that “all
parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge.” Day Br.
47 (emphasis added). But the document Day cites for that proposition,
Doc. 88, is a consent form dated May 20, 2011, signed by Day’s lawyer
in the name of only one plaintiff, “Miranda L. Day”—without any
indication that Day had (or even claimed) the authority to act on behalf
of a class—which makes sense given that class counsel were not
appointed until more than four months later. See Doc. 112, at 3 (Sept.
29, 2011). Thus, even assuming (incorrectly) that Miranda Day or her
lawyers later possessed the authority, as representatives of a certified
class, to consent to the entry of final judgment by a magistrate judge on
behalf of the class members, they never exercised that authority, and
this Court may reverse on that basis alone.
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B. The Magistrate Judge Lacked Authority to Enter
Final Judgment Because the Absent Class Members
Were Not Notified That the Named Plaintiff Was
Relinquishing Their Rights to an Article III Judge.
NACA’s opening brief (at 18-22) explains that even if 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) is constitutional as applied to class actions generally, its
application in this case was unconstitutional because the absentees
were not notified that they would be relinquishing their rights to an
Article III decision maker and that a magistrate judge would enter
final judgment. In general, we rely on our earlier arguments—which
the settling parties largely ignore—and reply on only two points.
1. Day (but not the other appellees) asserts, unadorned by any
authority, that because NACA’s notice argument is not jurisdictional
and was not raised below, it should not be addressed by this Court. Day
Br. 51. The premise of this assertion is wrong. The failure of notice here
concerns notice to the class members of their constitutional rights to an
Article III judge, which appellees do not (and cannot) dispute presents
a “jurisdictional question” that should be raised sua sponte even when
no one brings it to the court’s attention. McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1326, 1328 (11th Cir. 2001); see NACA Opening Br. 6-7.
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Moreover, even if we indulge Day’s counterfactual position, and
view the notice issue as unrelated to the Article III issue, the issue
would still be jurisdictional. An argument premised on a lack of notice
could not have been raised by class members who, by definition, did not
know that their rights were at stake. For that reason, without
constitutionally adequate notice, a class-action judgment cannot have
preclusive effect. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12, 105 S. Ct. at 2974
(1985); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
314-15, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657 (1950). As a result, a lack of notice is a proper
basis for collateral attack, which presupposes that the defect was not
raised in the underlying proceeding at all, see, e.g., Twigg v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1998), and underscores that it
can be raised for the first time on appeal. 
2. Turning to the merits, the settling parties say that due process
was satisfied because the settlement notice stated that the settlement
hearing would be before the magistrate judge. Day Br. 51 (citing
Williams, 159 F. 3d at 270). But cherry-picking one ambiguous
reference to the magistrate judge buried on page seven of a eight-page,
8
small-print notice, see Doc. 111-1, does not extricate the settling parties
from their due-process problem. NACA’s opening brief (at 20-21)
showed that a reader of the entire notice likely would not know the
identity of the final decision maker. This Court may reverse on that
narrow basis alone. See, e.g., Twigg, 153 F.3d at 1227-28 (describing the
considerable demands of due process in the class-action notice context).
But the settling parties ignore the bigger problem. Due process
requires that class members—who are lay people—be informed of the
action and the plaintiffs’ rights in it.” Shutts, 472 U.S. at 811-12, 105 S.
Ct. at 2974 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15, 70 S. Ct. at 657
(emphasis added)); see also In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig.,
552 F.2d 1088, 1103-05 (5th Cir. 1977) (class-action settlement notice
“will be the [absentees’] primary, if not exclusive, source of information
for deciding how to exercise their rights”). The right at issue here is the
constitutional right to an Article III decision maker, and neither that
right nor that Miranda Day was throwing that right to the winds is
mentioned anywhere in the notice.
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Put most charitably, what the settling parties did here was the
“mere gesture” at notice condemned by the Supreme Court over sixty
years ago. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S. Ct. at 657 (1950). For this
reason as well, the decision below should be reversed.3
II. A Court Should Never Defer to the Views or Reputation of
Counsel in Deciding Whether to Approve a Class-Action
Settlement. 
NACA’s opening brief (at 29-37) argued that a court should never
do what the magistrate judge did here: give weight to settling counsel’s
judgment about the wisdom of a class settlement and rely on class
counsel’s reputation in assessing a settlement’s fairness or legality.
On this issue, the settling parties’ briefs focus almost exclusively
on trying to prove that the case law authorized the magistrate judge’s
overt deference to class counsel’s views and reputation. Persels Br. 36-
 With regard to our argument that section 636(c) is facially3
unconstitutional, we rest almost entirely on our opening brief (at 22-29)
and reply on just one point. CareOne has misinterpreted our reliance
on Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). We agree that the result in
Stern is narrow and properly could be described as “sui generis.” See
CareOne Br. 56 & n.16. As our opening brief (at 27-28) noted, however,
Stern’s reasoning draws into serious question the continuing relevance
of consent as a factor in separation-of-powers analysis. See also Erwin
Chemerinsky, “Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern v. Marshall,”
2011 S. Ct. Rev. 183, 209-212. 
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37; Day Br. 42-45; CareOne Br. 47-49. The settling parties do not
dispute that the only on-point published opinion of this Court appears
to reject the magistrate judge’s approach because it renders the judge
“captive to the [class] attorney and fosters rubber stamping,” at odds
with the “careful scrutiny” that is “essential” when courts review class-
action settlements.  Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144,
1150 (11th Cir. 1983). CareOne seeks to distinguish Holmes, saying
that it authorizes deference in some cases, just not where the
settlement is unfair and counsel lacks knowledge of the case (as in
Holmes). CareOne Br. 49-50.
NACA disagrees. The better reading of Holmes is that, rather
than endorsing deference to counsel in any type of case, it was
describing some of the existing case law when it noted that deference
has been viewed as discretionary. That is the only sensible way to
reconcile Holmes with its forceful language quoted in part above and its
detailed list of “general concerns” with deference to class counsel. See
Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1150.
11
In any event, the Court should reject the settling parties’ efforts
to attribute to Holmes the illogical conclusion that deference to the
views and reputation of counsel is appropriate when the settlement is
fair and class counsel is well informed, but inappropriate when the
settlement is unfair or collusive. See Day Br. 45; CareOne Br. 49-50.
Deference is used, as it was below, in deciding whether a settlement is
fair, adequate, and reasonable. So, when the magistrate judge said that
he was relying on class counsel’s “judgment” that the settlement was a
good deal, Doc. 157, at 22, and when he trumpeted class counsel’s
“exceptional legal abilities” and “utmost integrity,” id., he had to be
taking those things into account in reaching his decision. Otherwise,
his reliance on them would have served no purpose.
As noted, the settling parties make almost no effort to defend
deference to counsel’s views and reputation in principle. After all, it is
hard to defend a doctrine that is at war with judicial independence. See
Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1150. In one respect, appellees’ silence is
particularly conspicuous and bears mention. NACA’s opening brief (at
35) observed that the settlement approval below was premised in part
12
on the magistrate judge’s statement that class counsel “are well known
to me,” and NACA noted that objector Gunn’s lead lawyer was unable
to receive the same special recognition—creating an imbalance among
the parties having nothing to do with the merits of the case. That
statement underscores why deference to counsel in class actions
undermines judicial independence and should not be permitted under
any circumstances. 
CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse because the magistrate judge exercised
power that the Constitution reserves to Article III judges. If the Court
disagrees, it should reverse because the magistrate judge
impermissibly deferred to class counsel’s views and reputation in
approving the settlement.
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